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Economic Losses and Strict Products
Liability: A Record of Judicial
Confusion Between Contract and Tort
I. Introduction
Defective products may cause various types of harm, and no single theory
of compensation can be designed for all cases. A successful products liability
suit offers an injured individual three potential forms of recovery: (1) "per-
sonal" damages, which compensate for bodily harm; (2) "property" damages,
which compensate for injury to property other than the defective product; and
(3) "economic" damages, of which "direct" compensate for harm to the
defective product itself and "consequential" for harm to business expectations,
such as profits and goodwill. Presently, the majority of courts allow recovery for
personal and property damages under the theory of strict liability in tort, but
limit recovery for "economic" loss to cases involving breach of an express war-
ranty.'
This note reviews the development and present status of the conflicting
rules governing recovery of economic damages in products liability cases. It is
contended that current judicial concepts are the result of the failure of courts to
identify the proper policy considerations behind tort and contract theory. Dif-
ferent rules of compensation for economic harm should exist in consumer as
opposed to commercial situations. This note distinguishes such principles on the
basis of contractual bargaining power.
II. From Henningsen to Seely: The
Evolution of a Theoretical Conflict
Modern products liability law developed as its theoretical foundation
evolved from contract to tort. Originally, the doctrine of privity required that
a plaintiff and defendant stand in a direct contractual relationship before the
former could recover for injuries inflicted by goods produced by the latter. This
rule legally insulated most manufacturers since the marketing of goods through
retailers precluded privity between the producer and the ultimate consumer.
The famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' led to abolition of privity
as a factor in negligence cases, but the defense remained valid against claims
which did not allege a lack of due care.' Beginning in 1960, however, a series of
decisions rendered in California and New Jersey greatly accelerated the develop-
ment of products liability law.
1 For a discussion of the case law involving these definitions see Note, Manufacturer's
Strict Tort Liability to Consumers for Economic Loss, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 401, 405 (1967);
Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13 IDAHO L. REv. 29, 40 (1976).
2 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (Ct. App. 1916).
3 Prior to the demise of privity, some courts took interesting approaches designed to
allow recovery without explicitly rejecting contractual theory. A much-cited example of this
strategy is Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd,
168 Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118 (Sup. Ct. 1932), which held that mass advertising created
sufficient contacts between manufacturer and consumer to overcome the common law privity
requirement.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court reached a momentous decision in Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.4 Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice
Francis declared that as a matter of law an implied warranty of fitness for every
product placed in the stream of commerce extended from the manufacturer to
the foreseeable user, notwithstanding the lack of a contractual relationship.
Furthermore, the court's language indicated that the right to waive such a war-
ranty would be extremely limited.
From a historical perspective, the underlying assumption of Henningsen-
that the law of contract did not offer the consumer adequate protection-has
proven more influential than the case's specific holding. The New Jersey
Supreme Court clearly believed that under modem market conditions the dis-
proportionate strength of the manufacturer made equitable bargaining, the
foundation of contract law, impossible. According to Justice Francis:
.... Manufacturers are few in number and strong in bargaining position....
From the standpoint of the purchaser, there can be no arm's length negotiat-
ing on the subject. Because his capacity for bargaining is so grossly un-
equal, the inexorable conclusion which follows is that he is not permitted to
bargain at all. He must take or leave the automobile on the warranty terms
dictated by the maker.5
Clearly, the court intended to design a new remedy for consumers. The
Henningsen warranty was not a contract because it was imposed by law for
policy reasons and did not require any promise on the part of the manufacturer.
In all but name, the New Jersey Supreme Court created a remedy in tort. Justice
Francis readily admitted this fact, reasoning that since warranty historically arose
from "a curious hybrid" of contract and tort, the formalistic requirements of the
former could be relaxed in the interest of equity.'
The judicial application of tort theory to products liability cases grew
dramatically in the wake of Henningsen. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.,7 the California Supreme Court specifically adopted the strict liability theory
defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(A)8 as the proper remedy for
4 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 '(1960).
5 Id. at 403, 161 A.2d at 94.
6 Id. at 412-17, 161 A.2d at 99-101.
7 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). It should be noted that the
Greenman court's statements on strict liability were dicta. Yuba had based its entire defense
on Greenman's failure to provide timely notice of his injuries. The court ruled that such
notice was not necessary in a personal injury case. Thus, Chief Justice Traynor could have
found for the plaintiff without even considering the concept of strict liability in tort. See
text accompanying notes 27 and 28 infra.
8 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(A) (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
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a plaintiff suffering bodily harm from a product produced and placed in the open
market by a defendant. This decision noted that cages such as Henningsen had
already reached much the same result in the guise of an implied warranty. Yet
Justice (later Chief Justice) Traynor, speaking for the Greenman court, stated
that strict liability in tort should be clearly adopted to demonstrate that con-
sumer remedies did not rest solely on contract theory.9
The first major case involving strict liability in tort as applied to economic
loss was decided in 1965. Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc."0 concerned a
plaintiff who, through a retailer, had purchased a defective and virtually worth-
less rug produced by the defendant-manufacturer. On appeal, the defendant
attempted to distinguish the case from Henningsen on the ground that economic
rather than personal injury was at issue. The New Jersey Supreme Court, again
through Justice Francis, rejected this distinction on the ground that no valid
policy considerations justified a standard of recovery for economic injury less
generous than that of the Henningsen warranty. The court could have decided
the case on this narrow issue, but decided to expand the scope of the opinion
significantly.
Justice Francis explained that the Henningsen implied warranty was simply
a legal device fashioned to yield a desired result: recovery for the plaintiff with-
out a wholesale incorporation of tort law into product cases. Citing Justice
Traynor's opinion in Greenman, however, Justice Francis stated that the time
had come to concede that consumer remedies did not hinge exclusively on the
law of sales contracts. Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court proclaimed
strict liability in tort to be a proper remedy in products liability cases. Justice
Francis ruled that since "responsibility of the maker should be no different where
damage to the article sold or to other property of the consumer is involved,"'1
strict liability in tort would also apply to direct economic loss. Subsequent New
Jersey case law has, albeit tentatively, extended Santor to consequential economic
injury. 2
The apparent harmony with which the California and New Jersey Supreme
Courts refined the law of products liability eventually ended. In Seely v. White
Motor Company," the plaintiff, a small businessman, included a demand for
lost profits incurred when a defective truck purchased from the defendant over-
turned. As in Greenman and Santor, Seely's most significant pronouncements
were dicta because the consequential damages were readily awarded at the outset
of the opinion on the basis of a breached express warranty. Nevertheless, Chief
Justice Traynor categorically refused to extend strict liability in tort to economic
injuries, direct or otherwise. Due to their "commercial" nature, such losses
were to remain under the jurisdiction of the law of sales as defined in the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). In effect, recovery for economic injury
in California would be dependent upon the plaintiff's showing that the de-
fendant had both granted and violated an express warranty.
9 59 Cal. 2d at 62-64, 377 'P.2d at 900-902, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-702.
10 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
11 Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
12 See text accompanying notes 43 and 44 infra.
13 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
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Most significantly, Chief Justice Traynor denied that strict liability in tort
had been applied to cases of bodily harm in order to compensate for the con-
sumer's slender bargaining power. Rather, he insisted that Greenman had
turned entirely on the potential tragedy of personal injury and the ability of
manufacturers to insure against it. Both of these factors were deemed lacking in
all cases involving economic harm. Therefore, Santor, which according to the
California Supreme Court saddled manufacturers with unlimited and unfore-
seeable liability, was rejected.' 4
Chief Justice Traynor did extend strict liability in tort to cover "property"
damage, however, on the theory that such harm was "akin" to personal injury.
5
Significantly, the Seely court accepted a definition of property interests broader
than the normal concept. In Seely, a defective part of the product (i.e., the
engine) caused damage to the rest of the product. Chief Justice Traynor con-
sidered such injury to be property damage even though the normal judicial defi-
nition would view it as direct economic harm. 6
Justice Peters, who had concurred with the Seely ruling on the warranty
issue, vigorously criticized the rationale as to economic loss. His dissent charged
that the majority's distinction between economic harm and other types of injury
was totally arbitrary. Furthermore, Justice Peters contended that the court
should focus not on the classification of damage sustained, but on the relationship
of the parties before the loss occurred. Thus, when the transaction was properly
described as "commercial," contract law should be applied, and where the
situation involved a consumer, the Henningsen-Santor strict liability rule ought
to prevail. The dissent conceded that the term "consumer" is vague, but main-
tained that a definition could be developed on a case-by-case basis.'
In considering the differences between the Santor and Seely rules, it is im-
portant to realize that they are the products of an underlying theoretical
dichotomy. Each springs from a substantive policy decision. Santor is derived
from Henningsen, which assumes that the consumer is inherently unable to
bargain with the manufacturer and therefore needs a tort remedy to safeguard
his or her interests. Seely, conversely, rejects any analysis of bargaining power
and, as a matter of law, insists that contract principles govern all cases of
economic loss. Thus, the difference between the New Jersey and California
rules reflects a fundamental conflict between contract and tort.
III. Practical Differences Between Santor and Seely
The conflicting theories behind the New Jersey and California rules translate
into practical differences concerning the source of liability, the available defenses,
the requirement of notice, the statute of limitations, and the standing of potential
plaintiffs. Furthermore, an understanding of these distinctions is necessary for
the jurist or legislator to determine which rule is superior.
14 Id. at 15-19, 403 P.2d at 149-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-24.
15 Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
16 Id.




A. Source of Liability
The Seely rule, since it is based on contract principles, views a breach of
promise by the defendant as a condition precedent to the imposition of liability
for economic damage. The controlling statutory provision is U.C.C. § 2-313,"8
which governs the requirements for express warranty. To recover such damages,
a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant presented an "affirmation of fact
or promise," "description," or "sample or model" of the product which became
part of the "basis of the bargain"; (2) the resulting warranty was violated by the
defendant; and (3) the plaintiff suffered economic loss as a result of the breach.
Failure to prove one or more of the these elements will defeat recovery.
Santor, however, requires no such promise because its remedy is based on
tort. Under the New Jersey rule, strict liability attaches as soon as the manu-
facturer places the product in the stream of trade and promotes its sale to the
public.19 Santor's scope of liability is therefore much broader.
This distinction is the greatest difference between the two rules. Under
Seely, a manufacturer who, pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Act,20 the U.C.C.,
and the relevant case law, withholds an express warranty or limits liability re-
sulting from a breach of such warranty can avoid responsibility for economic
loss. Santor, however, offers no such opportunity because it adheres to the
Henningsen principle that freedom to contract between manufacturers and
consumers necessarily leads to oppression of the latter.2
B. Defenses
In a jurisdiction following the California rule, the manufacturer has access
to the defenses available in a breach of contract action. For example, the plaintiff
must not only show that the benefits envisioned in the defendant's express war-
ranty never materialized, but also that the breaking of the promise, and not some
other factor, proximately caused the economic injury for which relief is sought.2
The manufacturer, moreover, cannot be held liable for damages beyond the
18 U.C.C. § 2-313 (1972 version) states:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the
sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific in-
tention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of
the goods does not create a warranty.
19 32 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
20 The Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1977), enacted in 1975, is
designed to give consumers warranty protection beyond that provided by the U.C.C.
21 Recently, one case has recognized the possibility that strict liability in tort may be
open to waiver in contracts between commercial parties standing in equal bargaining positions.
See text accompanying note 54 infra.
22 Heil v. Standard Chemical Mfg. Co., 301 Minn. 315, 223 N.W.2d 37 '(1974).
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amount contemplated by the parties at the time the warranty was made.23
Under Santor, on the other hand, a manufacturer can only rely on tort
defenses which vary in form and potency according to jurisdiction. Representa-
tive examples include: (1) intervening cause of injury, 4 (2) defendant's ex-
pectation that the product will be inspected by a third party,25 and (3) "state
of the art," which gives special indulgence fo innovation by denying strict
liability in tort when the product is as safe as possible at its present stage of
development.2"
Under Seely, defenses are formalistic applications of contract law. The
California courts look to what was promised and whether a breach occurred.
The Santor principle, on the other hand, requires that judges consider each
factual situation individually before they decide which defenses apply. In this
area, therefore, the New Jersey rule is much more flexible.
C. Requirement of Notice
U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (a) 27 requires that a purchaser notify the warrantor of
all product non-conformities within a "reasonable time" following acceptance
of tender. Failure to adhere to this rule waives all remedies, including those
provided by express warranty. This notification is mandatory under Seely, which
holds that the U.C.C. and contract law control the right to collect economic
damages. No corollary to U.C.C. § 2-607 exists under Santor, however, and
thus notice is not a requirement.
The notice rule is well-suited to the business world because it discourages
litigation by increasing the opportunity of sellers in breach to cure non-conform-
ing tenders. No such justification, however, exists in the case of the consumer,
who is often ignorant of the mandate. Indeed, the provision is so burdensome
that some courts have carved out special exceptions to it. The Greenman
decision, for example, included a holding that notification is not needed in
personal injury cases.2
23 Compare Head & Guild Equipment Co. v. Bond, 470 S.W.2d 909, 910-13 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1971) (denying consequential damages for lost profits from collateral contracts when
there was no evidence that the defendant had any knowledge of them) with Thomas v. Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 255 Cal. App. 2d 806, 809, 63 Cal. Rptr. 455, 456-57
(1967) (sustaining a complaint seeking damages for "the loss of honor, prestige and victory
involved in killing a Bengal tiger... .").
24 Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1973).
25 Compare Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958) (allowing the
defense when the third party agreed to finish processing the defective product) with Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1967) (disallow-
ing the defense when the product was entirely manufactured by the defendant).
26 Compare Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 317, 413 P. 2d 400 (1966) with Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). (Both cases involved pre-
scription drugs.)
27 U.C.C. § 2-607 (3) (a) (1972 version) provides:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy ...
28 See note 7 infra. See also Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, 295 F.2d
292, 299 (3rd Cir. 1961) (ten-month delay in notification held "reasonable"); Ryderman v.
Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn. 416, 184 A.2d 63 (1962) (held that the
notification rule simply does not apply to consumers).
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Significantly, both Santor and Seely handle the U.C.C. notice requirement
incorrectly. A proper approach would enforce U.C.C. § 2-607 in commercial sit-
uations and abandon the duty in consumer cases to which the provision was not
intended to apply. Yet both the New Jersey and California rules approach the
issue without regard to this distinction.
D. Statute of Limitations
The conceptual distinction between contract and tort underlying Santor
and Seely translates into another concrete difference in the applicable statute of
limitations. A court applying the California rule would be constrained by
U.C.C. § 2-725 (1) 9 which requires that breach of warranty actions be brought
within four years of the transaction. The parties may even agree to reduce this
period to a minimum of one year. Santor, of course, is governed by the jurisdic-
tion's personal injury jimitation of actions.
Since the New Jersey rule is based on tort, it may also allow the plaintiff
to take advantage of the practice adopted in many states of tolling the statute of
limitations until the injury is actually discovered. In Rosenau. v. City of New
Brunswick," for example, a strict liability action for damage incurred from a
burst water meter was sustained even though installation of the equipment had
taken place more than two decades before institution of the suit. Economic
damages in such a case would be impossible under Seely, however, because this
tolling of the statute of limitations does not apply to the law of sales contracts.
E. Standing for Potential Plaintiffs
A final distinction between contract and tort liability concerns the eligibility
of injured persons to bring suit. Under common law warranty theory, a plaintiff
first had to satisfy the demands of privity before a remedy would be awarded.
The privity requirements that remain are codified in U.C.C. § 2-318, which
allows a jurisdiction to choose among three options."1 All of these alternatives
29 U.C.C. § 2-725 (1972 version) reads in relevant part:
'(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties
may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
30 51 N.J. 146, 238 A.2d 177 (1968).
31 U.C.C. § 318 (1972 version) grants states the following choices:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty
extends. As amended 1966.
[October 1978]
[Vol. 54:102]
protect the purchasing consumer. Additionally, injured third parties to whom
damage is foreseeable are afforded protection under the following provisions:
(1) (Option A) any "natural person" associated with the purchaser as a family
relation, household member, or guest; (2) (Option B) any "natural person"
injured by the goods "in person"; and (3) (Option C) "any person" injured by
the goods.
A Santor jurisdiction, conversely, would employ the principles of standing
used in general strict liability cases. This standard varies throughout the nation.
The trend, nonetheless, is exemplified by Elmore v. American Motors Corp.
3 2
which held that liability extends to bystanders as well as to actual purchasers.
Although this distinction may not be particularly significant, the fact remains
that a plaintiff's standing under Seely is determined by a jurisdiction's contract
law, whereas under Santor the question is a matter of tort theory. A practitioner,
therefore, must be careful to look to the correct body of law in determining the
extent of liability in a particular case.
F. Santor and Seely: Summary of the Comparison
The theoretical foundations of the New Jersey rule lead to concrete ad-
vantages for plaintiffs who seek to recover economic damages. Undeniably,
Santor is much more generous than Seely in assessing damages. The problem
with both holdings is that they provide for no exceptions. New Jersey, apparently
assuming that all purchasers are as disadvantaged as the Henningsen plaintiff
in bargaining with sellers, grants the benefits of strict liability in tort to all who
suffer economic harm. California, on the other hand, upholds the freedom to
contract without ever considering the significance of bargaining power.
Neither rule recognizes that not all plaintiffs are alike. Rather than apply
different remedies to different situations as may be appropriate, both Santor and
Seely simply prescribe one norm for all economic damage litigation. The result
in both cases is a set of inflexible standards.
IV. Beyond Santor and Seely: The Record
Since 1965, courts have faced two major tasks concerning economic injury.
The first involves resolving theoretical issues not confronted in previous cases,
such as the treatment of consequential business losses under the New Jersey rule.
Second, the deceptively simple formulas adopted by the Santor and Seely courts
have had to be applied to varied situations.
A proper examination of the post-Seely cases must consider rulings directly
adhering to either contract or tort principles as applied to economic loss. Special
attention, moreover, should be paid to Nebraska where an interesting variation
of the California rule has emerged. Finally, a survey should be made of the
Texas appellate courts which have adopted neither Santor nor Seely but have
sought other solutions.
32 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
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A. The Nebraska Rule: An Extended Exercise in Formalism
In Kohler v. Ford Motor Co.,33 the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted
strict liability in tort for product cases involving personal injuries. Property and
economic damages, however, were not specifically considered until 1973.
Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc. 4 involved a suit against the
lessor and manufacturer of defective scaffolding which had collapsed while being
used. The plaintiff urged the court to adopt the Santor principle.
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice White agreed that the logic of the
New Jersey rule seemed "irresistible,""5 but he proceeded to distinguish injury
to a product resulting from its own defect (i.e., direct economic loss) from
injury to other property resulting from the defect. The Hawkins decision readily
accepted strict liability in tort as a valid remedy in the latter situation. Chief
Justice White, however, insisted that in the case of economic injury the legis-
lature had already provided the plaintiff with a cause of action under the
U.C.C.'s warranty sections. To go beyond this remedy, the majority held, would
"emasculate""3 the Uniform Commercial Code. For no apparent reason,
Hawkins assumed that the U.C.C. completely preempts the field of consumer
protection. With this deference to perceived legislative intent, the court refused
to accept Santor and denied the plaintiff recovery for the damaged scaffolding
under strict liability in tort.
Chief Justice White's distinction between direct economic loss and
property damage has the potential to affect many types of judgments and cause
anomalous results. Under the Nebraska version of Seely, for example, an in-
dividual who purchases a defective furnace only to have it explode and incinerate
his home could sue under strict liability in tort for damage to the house, but not
to the furnace. The California rule, of course, would consider injury to both the
house and furnace to be "property damage" and recoverable under strict liability
in tort.
B. The Seely Progeny
One of Chief Justice Traynor's main arguments against the imposition of
strict liability in tort for economic loss was that the Santor rule had the potential
for authorizing unjustified and unforeseeable recoveries. Therefore, it is inter-
esting to note how liberal the courts following the California principle have been
in applying the Seely definition of property injury." In Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz
Co.,38 for example, a defective electric blanket ignited a fire that demolished the
plaintiff's home. The Supreme Court of Oregon, which follows the California
rule, authorized recovery for the full value of the house under strict liability in
tort. The opinion did not question the plaintiff's definition of property damage.
An important extension of the property damage concept is Bombardi v.
33 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
34 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
35 209 N.W.2d at 652.
36 Id.
37 See text accompanying note 15 infra.
38 262 Or. 293, 498 'P.2d 766 (1972).
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Pochel's Appliance and T.V. Company," a Washington case involving the in-
cineration of an apartment house. The destruction was caused by a defective
television set purchased by the plaintiff-landlord. On appeal, the defendant
argued that recovery for the building should be disallowed as an economic loss.
The court, nevertheless, held that the injury constituted property damage and
was fully recoverable under the California rule.
There is no reason to believe that the "property" damage suffered by the
landlord in Bombardi is any more of a personal tragedy than the "economic"
injury sustained by the small businessman in Seely. Furthermore, it is doubtful
that the damages in Bombardi and Wulff, both of which far exceeded the
$9,240.40 consequential loss4 ° sought in Seely, were any more foreseeable than
those feared by Chief Justice Traynor. The California rule, however, tends to be
formalistic and apportions recovery on the basis of an almost mechanical ap-
plication of the definition of the type of damage. Accordingly, Chief Justice
Traynor's policy decisions, which form the entire basis of the Seely principle,
are violated in cases such as Bombardi and Wulff, which theoretically adhere to
the California position.
C. In the Wake of Santor
During the years following the Santor decision, the New Jersey courts ex-
panded the scope of strict liability in tort applied to personal, property, and
direct economic loss. Examples of this trend include extension of the theory to
used car dealers4' and to the mass-producers of homes. 2 Not until 1974, how-
ever, did a court approach the concept of consequential economic harm in a
commercial context. 3
Monsanto Company v. Alden Leeds, Inc. 4' arose from the sale of a large
quantity of dry organic chlorine which exploded and caused extensive property
destruction as well as consequential economic damage. When the plaintiff
brought suit for non-payment for the chlorine, the defendant counterclaimed for
all injury resulting from the blast, including lost business profits. In denying the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim, Judge Dreier
39 9 Wash. App. 797, 515 P.2d 540 (1973).
40 63 Cal. 2d at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
41 Realmuto v. Straub Motors, 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974).
42 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
43 Several cases from other jurisdictions involving consequential damages are occasionally
cited as explicitly adopting the Santor theory of strict liability in tort. Many of these author-
ities are questionable or erroneous, including:
(1) Air Products & Chemical Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis.2d 193, 206 N.W.2d
414 '(1973). Although this case did accept Santor, it merely involved the Wisconsin Supreme
Court interpreting Pennsylvania law. Recently, 'Plainwell Paper Company v. Pram, Inc., 430
F. Supp. 1386 (W.D. Pa. 1977) has cast doubt on the validity of the Fairbanks Morse ruling.
(2) Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Company, 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970). This decision was remanded to a lower court with instructions to hear a claim for
consequential economic loss. Since the issue had never been fully briefed, however, the court
made clear that any judgment in the lower court would be reexamined. Michigan has not
yet decided the question.
(3) Ford Motor Company v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 406, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966). This ruling
permitted recovery of consequential economic loss, but the action was founded on misrepre-
sentation.
44 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (1974).
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declared, "Even in these days of consumerism, economic interests are not out of
favor .... Corporations are, in the last analysis, owned by people who rely upon
them for their income, and thus commercial losses often are reflected in personal
sorrow."
4 5
Santor, especially when interpreted by Alden Leeds, certainly contains the
elements of a theory that could allow consequential economic damages in a
commercial setting. No case citing the New Jersey rule, however, has ever
actually awarded such a recovery. Other than Alden Leeds," moreover, no
judgment has even acknowledged that the Santor holding should be so expanded.
Perhaps the courts, including those of New Jersey, realize that public policy
would not be enhanced by a wholesale incorporation of the Henningsen rationale
into the world of commerce.
D. Texas: Between Santor and Seely
The Supreme Court of Texas has never officially chosen between the New
Jersey and California rules. Thus, the lower appellate bodies of the state have
been relatively free to innovate in the area of economic injury. Recent cases have
shown contrasting approaches to the question.
In Monsanto Company v. Thrasher,47 the defendant sold the plaintiff
defective herbicide which allowed the plaintiff's fields to become overrun with
weeds. Damages amounting to the difference in value of the crop expected and
that actually harvested were awarded under strict liability in tort. Speaking for
the court, Justice Joy conceded that consequential economic damages were
being granted. He maintained, however, that no other standard was equitable
in such a situation. On the matter of the tort remedy, Justice joy described such
strict liability as "separate and apart" from the U.C.C. and available when "the
consumer is not adequately protected by the law of sales."4
Another progressive ruling occurred in Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v.
Shivers49 in which the plaintiff sued for the value of a flawed mobile home. Strict
liability in tort was not adopted in this case because the court declined to expand
upon Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 (A)'s limitation of coverage to "phys-
ical harm." The court in Shivers did, however, rule that the consumer is pro-
tected by an implied warranty of fitness similar to that established in Henningsen
and expanded to cover economic injury."
Some Texas courts adhere to the California rule, as can be seen in Mid
Continent Aircraft v. Curry County Spraying." This case superficially appears
45 Id. at, 259, 326 A2d. at 97.
46 Alden Leeds explicitly extended Santor to cover consequential losses. See id.
47 463 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1971).
48 Id. at 27.
49 539 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1976).
50 Interestingly, the same court that decided Shivers has shown a tendency to be
strict with regard to pleadings. Explorer's Motor Home Corp. v. Aldridge, 541 S.W.2d 851
(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1976) involved a substantially similar fact pattern, but the plaintiffs
based their case entirely on a restitution theory. The court ruled that this claim brought the
case within the realm of the U.C.C., and recovery was denied for failure to give notice of the
warranty breach.
51 553 S.W.2d 935 '(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1977).
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to follow the New Jersey doctrine since the ruling affirmed an award based on
strict liability in tort which included compensation for lost profits. On motion
for rehearing, nevertheless, the court clearly stated that the consequential injury
recovery would have been overturned had the defendant not failed to raise the
appropriate -objection on appeal. Thus, the Mid Continent ruling supports the
California rule on economic loss.52
A review of these recent Texas decisions reveals some interesting results.
First, in the absence of a uniform controlling rule, such as those mandated in
Santor or Seely, some courts are, as in Thrasher, able to render equitable de-
cisions based on the facts of the situation. Others, such as the Shivers tribunal,
reach the same result through adoption of a Henningsen-like legal fiction. A final
set of cases follow the Mid Continent" practice of seeking a uniform solution
regardless of the situation.
V. Conclusion and Proposal
Both Santor and Seely are deeply flawed by failure to distinguish the com-
mercial setting from the consumer situation. The California rule and its
Nebraska variation are so formalistic that they often lose sight of original policy
purposes and thus make anomalous results possible. The Santor-Alden Leeds
theory, conversely, threatens to nullify the U.C.C. warranty provisions by ex-
tending strict liability in tort to all business circumstances. Neither rule attempts
to apply appropriate remedies to different situations.
In his dissent in Seely, Justice Peters noted that "consumer" is a vague term.
A definition, nonetheless, is needed to provide a rational policy, and its source lies
in a reexamination of Henningsen. The individuals protected by the New Jersey
rule should be defined with reference to the evil that strict liability in tort was
intended to remedy: disparate bargaining power. When two parties stand in
such a position that they are able to bargain fairly and thus equitably apportion
the risks inherent in their transaction, the U.C.C. warranty provisions should be
upheld. Yet when a comparison of the antagonists reveals that their "agreement"
consisted of terms dictated by the stronger, "freedom to contract" is a sham, and
strict liability in tort is the only valid remedy for all damages, whether personal,
property, or economic. Matters of degree in bargaining power should be resolved
on a case-by-case basis, as Justice Peters suggested.
Significantly, this proposed resolution of the Santor-Seely confrontation does
not turn on a sterile categorization of occupations. The Seely plaintiff was most
likely a "merchant" under the U.C.C. Certain large-scale farmers, on the other
hand, might not traditionally be considered in a commercial context. Under this
proposal, however, the former would be more likely to receive the protection of
the New Jersey rule because the latter probably enjoy a stronger bargaining
position in their commercial dealings.
Some courts have shown an attitude conducive to such a definition of
52 Id. at 943.
53 For a similar holding, see Thermal Supply of Texas, Inc. v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927
(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1971).
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"consumer." In Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp.,4 for ex-
ample, the Third Circuit interpreted Pennsylvania law to allow parties standing
on an equal contractual footing to limit damages usually recoverable under
strict liability in tort. Furthermore, in Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,55 the court explained that although Iowa law might
accept the Santor rule in cases of disparate contractual strength, "[t]he doctrine
of strict liability in tort, designed to aid the consumer in an unequal bargaining
position who is injured, loses all meaning when a large public utility or other
large company is the plaintiff and is suing solely for commercial loss."56
Common law precedents are designed to serve justice and the common
good. When they become so rigid that they fail to further the purposes for which
they were designed, they should be modified or eliminated. In Henningsen,
justice Francis wrote, "The task of the judiciary is to serve the spirit as well as
the letter of the law."5 Santor, Seely, and their progeny, however, have de-
parted from the spirit of the law.
Frank Charles Sabatino
54 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
55 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
56 Id. at 32.
57 32 N.J. at 403, 161 A.2d at 94.
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